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PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS AGAINST THE EFFECTS
OF HOSTILITIES UNDER CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND UNDER PROTOCOL I
Waldemar A. Solf*
INTRODUCTION
Humanitarian law is the outgrowth of centuries of warfare from
which the rules and customs governing the conduct of hostilities have
developed. Its development was stimulated by military men who recog-
nized that violence and destruction, which are superfluous to actual
military necessity, are not only immoral and wasteful of scarce re-
sources, but are also counter-productive to the attainment of the politi-
cal objectives for which military force is used.
The purpose of this presentation is to outline the historical develop-
ment of restraints on the methods and means of warfare, their accept-
ance as customary law binding on all states, and the relation of custom-
ary law to the codifications of international law in the Hague
Conventions of 1907,1 the Geneva Conventions of 1949,2 and the 1977
* Adjunct Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, The American University,
Member, U.S. Delegation to the Diplomatic Conference on International Humanita-
rian Law, 1974-1977.
This Article is based on a speech delivered by the author at a Seminar for Diplomats
on Humanitarian Law sponsored by the American Red Cross and The American Uni-
versity, Washington College of Law in June, 1985. The editors and staff of the Ameri-
can University Journal of International Law and Policy have provided supplementary
footnotes for this Article.
1. Hague Convention No. IV of 18 October 1907, Respecting the Laws and Cus-
toms of War on Land, 36 Stat. 2227, T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter cited as Hague Con-
vention No. IV] and the annex thereto, embodying the Regulations Respecting the
Laws and Customs of War on Land, 36 Stat. 2295 [hereinafter cited as Hague Regula-
tions]; Hague Convention No. V of 18 October 1907, Respecting the Rights and Duties
of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, 36 Stat. 2310, T.S. No. 540
[hereinafter cited as Hague Convention No. V]; Hague Convention No. IX of 18 Octo-
ber 1907, Respecting Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War, 36 Stat. 2351,
T.S. No. 542 [hereinafter cited as Hague Convention No. IX].
2. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of 12 August 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No.
3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter cited as First Geneva Convention of 1949]; Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Ship-
wrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of 12 August 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S.
No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter cited as Second Geneva Convention of 1949],
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter cited as Third Geneva
Convention of 1949]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
Protocol I additional to the Geneva Conventions.
I. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRINCIPLES
OF RESTRAINT ON THE METHODS AND MEANS OF
WARFARE
Throughout history, men have preached about the restraints on the
methods and means of warfare. As early as the fourth century B.C.,
Sun Tzu's classic, The Art of War, noted that there was an obligation
to care for the wounded and prisoners of war.' He observed that atroci-
ties infuriated the enemy, stiffened their resistance and increased their
fighting ability instead of paralyzing them with terror.0
In 634 A.D., Caliph Abu Bakr exhorted the first Moslem Arab Army
invading Christian Syria to learn certain rules by heart:
Do not commit treachery, nor depart from the right path. You must not muti-
late, neither kill a child or aged man or woman. Do not destroy a palm tree, nor
burn it with fire and do not cut any fruitful tree. You must not slay any of the
flock or the herds or the camels, save for your subsistence. You are likely to pass
by people who have devoted their lives to monastic services; leave them to that to
which they have devoted their lives.6
Shakespeare quotes Henry V, instructing his army on the march to
Agincourt in 1415: "[W]e give express charge, that in our marches
through the country, there be nothing compelled from the villages,
nothing taken but paid for, none of the French upbraided or abused in
disdainful language; for when lenity and cruelty play for a kingdom,
the gentler gamester is the soonest winner." 7
In 1923, Admiral William L. Rodgers, an acute observer of war,
wrote in a lead article in the American Journal of International Law:
It pleases us to call rules of war humanitarian, but really they fulfill a double
object: as toward the individual enemy these restrictive rules are humane; as
towards one's own organized forces these restrictives promote discipline and effi-
ciency, and so help to shorten war through earlier and more complete victory
over the hostile state . . .[T]hus these so called humane rules are advantageous
in Time of War of 12 August 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S.
287 [hereinafter cited as Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949] [all four hereinafter col-
lectively cited as the Geneva Convention of 1949].
3. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and Relating to the Pro-
tection of Victims of International Conflicts (Protocol 1), opened for signature Dec. 12,
1977, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 551 (D. Schindler & J. Toman 2d
rev. ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Protocol I].
4. SUN Tzu, THE ART OF WAR 75-76 (S. Griffith trans. 1963).
5. Id.
6. M. KHADDURI, WAR AND PEACE IN THE LAW OF ISLAM 102 (1955).
7. W. Shakespeare, The Life of Henry the Fifth, act III, sc. vi (1599).
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simultaneously to both sides.8
Most of the early rules of war were in the form of orders issued by
sovereign authorities for the regulation of their own armed forces. In
time, various practices of civilized nations, all of whom imposed similar
limitations on their own actions, became regarded as rules binding on
them all.
The Catholic Church exercised significant influence in the develop-
ment of restraints in war from the fourth century A.D. The early Chris-
tians were extreme pacifists who considered military service incompati-
ble with Christian principlesY As a minority and dissident sect with no
responsibility for the security of the empire, they could savor their
moral superiority and venerate their martyrs to the cause of pacifism.10
But when Caesar became a Christian, the Church, as an accommoda-
tion, developed the Just War Doctrine which accepted the necessity of
going to war for a just cause."" The Just War Doctrine dealt primarily
with the conditions justifying resort to war: the jus ad bellum; it also
held that the conduct of the just war, jus in bello, must conform to the
principles of discrimination and proportion.
1 2
The principle of discrimination prescribed the immunity of the inno-
cent from direct attack. Who are the innocent? Francisco de Vitoria,
the noted theologian and jurist, included women, children, "harmless
agricultural folk," "the rest of the peaceable civilian population," and
"clerics and members of a religious order."1 Realizing that collateral
casualties among the innocent must be expected, theologians recog-
nized the rule of "double effect," distinguishing intended killing of
combatants from unintended, accidental killing of civilians. 4 The latter
is excusable. But what about a situation where it is expected that there
will be unintended killings? Vitoria concludes: "[I]t is never right to
slay the guiltless, even as an indirect and unintended result, except
when there is no other means of carrying on the operations of a just
war . . . . "'5 In such a case the principle of proportion becomes
dominant.' 6
8. Rodgers, Suggestions as to Changes in the International Law for Maritime War-
fare, 17 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 4 (1923).
9. S. BAILEY, PROHIBITIONS AND RESTRAINTS IN WAR 2 (1972).
10. Id. at 1-2.
11. Id. at 3-5.
12. Id. at 12.
13. F. DE VITORIA, DE INDIS ET DE IURE BELu RELECTIONES 179 (J. Bate trans.
1917 of 1696 ed.).
14. Id. at 179; see also BAILEY, supra note 9, at 12-13.
15. VITORIA, supra note 13, at 179.
16. BAILEY, supra note 9, at 13-14. "For if little effect upon the ultimate issue of the
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The principles of restraint and the influence of the natural law prin-
ciples of discrimination and proportion virtually disappeared in the un-
restrained savagery of the Thirty Years War from 1618-1648. The
Peace of Westphalia 17 also diminished the influence of the Church by
recognizing the absolute sovereignty of princes, each of whom had a
direct pipeline to God. In 1625, Hugo Grotius published his master-
work, The Law of War and Peace, in which he analyzed the practice of
states over the centuries in order to outline systematically how that
practice had hardened into the law of nations. 18
The 18th century Age of Reason was an era of limited wars during
which the restraints of the jus in bello became well known to the pro-
fessional soldiers of the time. Armies were relatively small and very
expensive; limited violence was an exercise of prudent self interest. Va-
rious nations entered into bilateral treaties, addressing in advance par-
ticular questions which might arise in the event of war between the
parties. The subjects commonly covered were the rights of alien citi-
zens, the rules of naval prizes, the status of diplomats, the limitations
of legitimate military targets and the protection of prisoners of war.
The Napoleonic war and the French Revolution put an end to the
era of limited warfare. Thereafter, wars were fought by nations in
arms. The entire population was mobilized for the war effort, blurring
the distinction between combatants and civilians, putting great strain
on the customary law of war. As Winston Churchill commented:
"When democracy forced itself upon the battlefield war ceased to be a
gentleman's game." 9 Nevertheless, the customary jus in bello sur-
vived, taking modest account of changed conditions of warfare. The
mobilization of mass armies necessitated precise codified rules which
would serve as instruction to citizen armies.
war is to be expected from the storming of a fortress or fortified town wherein are
many innocent folk, it would not be right, for the purpose of assailing a few guilty, to
slay the many innocent by use of . . means likely to overwhelm indifferently both
innocent and guilty." VITORIA, supra note 13, at 179. The principle of proportion also
holds that it is forbidden to use weapons which would cause unnecessary suffering or
superfluous injury. "The aim [of the this element of the modern rules] was not primar-
ily to spare civilians, but to avoid causing suffering to combatants in excess of what is
essential to place an adversary hors de combat." BAILEY, supra note 9, at 79-80. See
also infra note 78 and accompanying text (discussing the rule of proportionality).
17. Treaty of Peace Between Sweden and the Empire, signed at Osnabruck (Peace
of Westphalia I), 24 Oct. 1648, 1 Consol. Treaty Series 119; Treaty of Peace Between
France and the Empire, signed at Munster (Peace of Westphalia I!), 24 Oct. 1648, 1
Consol. Treaty Series 271.
18. H. GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI ET PACds LIBRI TRES (F. Kelsey trans. 1925 of
1625 ed.); BAILEY, supra note 9, at 25.
19. Winston Churchill, quoted in Ford, Resistance Movements and International
Law, 8 INT'L REv. RED CROSS 43 (1968).
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II. ACCEPTANCE AND CODIFICATION OF THE
RESTRAINTS ON THE METHODS AND MEANS OF
WARFARE
The first systematic codification of the restraints on the methods and
means of warfare was the Instructions for the Government of the Ar-
mies of the United States in the Field, prepared by Professor Francis
Lieber in 1863 during the American Civil War.y0 The Lieber Instruc-
tions took into account the needs of a nation in arms and the influence
of the Industrial Revolution. Lieber's treatment of the principle of mili-
tary necessity is significant: "Military necessity, as understood by mod-
ern civilized nations, consists in the necessity of those measures which
are indispensable for securing the ends of the war, and which are law-
ful according to the modern law and usages of war" (emphasis
added).2 Lieber outlined in considerable detail those measures which
were permitted and those which were prohibited by customary law.
Among the measures prohibited was "any act of hostility which makes
the return to peace unnecessarily difficult." 22 To promote understand-
ing, the Lieber Instructions stated the reasons for each rule. In this
respect it was a fairly accurate reflection of the customary law of war
as it was understood in 1863.
The Lieber Instructions stimulated efforts to codify the law applica-
ble to armed conflict, culminating in the Brussels Conference of 1874,23
which laid the groundwork for the Hague Conventions of 189924 and
1907.25 The Hague Conventions were not as comprehensive as the
Lieber Instructions. The Hague Conventions omitted the reasons for
the rules,26 and with few exceptions, limited the text to prohibitions
without stating what was permitted. This practice was based on the
belief of humanitarian scholars that a humanitarian instrument should
provide what is to be spared, and should not explicitly authorize vio-
lence. 27 Frequently, this restraint sacrificed clarity; military men
20. U.S. DEP'T OF WVAR, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ARiJIES OF
THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD, GENERAL ORDERS No. 100 (1863) (Lieber Instruc-
tions), reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 3 (D. Schindler & J. Toman 2d
rev. ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Lieber Instructions].
21. Lieber Instructions, supra note 20, at art. 14.
22. Id. at art. 16.
23. Project of an International Declaration Concerning the Laws & Customs of
War, Brussels Conference of 1874, reprinted in I Am. J. INT'L L. Supp. 96-103 (1907).
24. Hague Convention No. II of 29 July 1899, with Respect to the Laws and Cus-
toms of War on Land, 32 Stat. 1803, reprinted in 1 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 129-53
(1907).
25. Hague Convention No. IV, supra note 1.
26. Cf. Martens Clause, infra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
27. In the debates concerning article 18 of the First Geneva Convention providing
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tended to consider permissible any measure not expressly prohibited.
This was in error, for customary law remained in full force, except to
the extent modified by conventional law.
The preambles to the Hague Convention No. II of 1899 and the
Hague Convention No. IV of 1907 each contain a Martens Clause 8
the latter of which states:
[T]he High Contracting Parties clearly do not intend that unforeseen cases
should, in the absence of a written undertaking, be left to the arbitrary judgment
of military commanders.
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the High
Contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in
the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain
under the protection and rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they
result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of hu-
manity, and the dictates of the public conscience.29
The rules of the 1907 Hague Regulations were negotiated with mili-
tary necessity in mind, and cited necessity expressly to justify deroga-
tions from certain prohibitory rules.30 Necessity, however, is not de-
fined. The reluctance to express what is authorized under customary
law made it necessary for military manuals to fill in the lacunae, in-
cluding a statement as to the meaning and limitations of military
necessity.
The First Geneva Convention of 186411 became the first multilateral
for the role of the civilian population in collecting and caring for the wounded and sick,
the drafting committee rejected a proposal that the civilian population could not with-
hold the wounded and sick they had collected from possible control by the military
authorities. While recognizing that the authorities had the undoubted right to issue
regulations establishing such control, the committee did not believe this should be men-
tioned in a humanitarian instrument. INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY:
GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF WOUNDED AND
SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 190 (J. Pictet ed. 1952); see also M. BOTHE, K.
PARTSCH & W. SOLF, NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: COMMENTARY
ON THE Two 1977 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949
322 (1982) (concerning objections voiced in the 1974-77 Diplomatic Conference about
the departure from tradition in the definition of military objectives).
28. The Martens Clause is named after Fyodor Martens, the Russian diplomat and
jurist who drafted it. A similar formula appears in each of the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions and in the 1977 Protocols. See First Geneva Convention of 1949, supra note 2, at
art. 63(4); Second Geneva Convention of 1949, supra note 2, at art. 62(4); Third Ge-
neva Convention of 1949, supra note 2, at art. 142(4); Fourth Geneva Convention of
1949, supra note 2, at art. 158(4); Protocol I, supra note 3, at art. 1(2); Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Vic-
tims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), opened for signature Dec. 12,
1977, preamble, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 621 (D. Schindler & J.
Toman 2d rev. ed. 1981).
29. See Hague Convention No. IV, supra note 1, at preamble (Martens Clause).
30. Hague Regulations, supra note 1, at art. 23(g).
31. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in
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treaty governing land warfare. The resulting Law of Geneva protected
wounded in armies in the field, medical personnel, units and transports.
Through the stimulus of the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC), 32 the Law of Geneva was updated in 1899,-" 1906,31 1929,11
1949,6 and 1977, s  expanding its protection to additional victims of
war. In particular, the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 extended
protection to civilians under the control of the opposing party.rs
Although treaties, as contractual instruments, are binding only upon
the contracting parties, the principles and rules of treaties which are
declaratory of customary international law are also binding on non-par-
ties. New development of principles of treaties, if widely practiced by
parties and non-parties alike, may become customary international law.
For example, the 1907 Hague Convention No. IV included a general
participation clause which provided that its regulations were binding
only if all participants to a war were parties to that Convention.-3
Thus, the 1907 Hague Convention, as a treaty, was not applicable in
either World War because not all belligerent states were parties to the
Convention. Similarly, the 1929 Geneva Prisoner of War Convention'
0
was not applicable between Germany and the Soviet Union because the
Soviet Union had never ratified it. But when the Nazi defendants in the
Nuremberg trials raised the non-applicability of the Hague and Geneva
Conventions as a matter of defense, the International Military Tribunal
held that the general principles of these Conventions had passed into
general international law and were thus binding on Germany.I In The
High Command Case,'42 however, the International Military Tribunal
Armies in the Field. of 22 August 1864, 22 Stat. 940, T.S. No. 377.
32. See INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS HANDBOOK
407 (1983) (discussing the Statutes of the International Red Cross which set out the
organizational structure of the Red Cross).
33. Hague Convention No. III for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Prin-
ciples of the Geneva Conventions of 22 August 1864, 32 Stat. 1827, T.S. No. 453.
34. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armies in the Field of 6 July 1906, 35 Stat. 1885, T.S. No. 464.
35. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armies in the Field of 27 July 1929, 47 Stat. 2074, T.S. No. 847; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 27 July 1929, 47 Stat.
2021, T.S. No. 846.
36. Geneva Conventions of 1949, supra note 2.
37. Protocol I, supra note 3.
38. Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, supra note 2, at art. 4.
39. Hague Convention No. IV, supra note I, at art. 2.
40. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929, 47
Stat. 2021, T.S. No. 846, 118 L.N.T.S. 343.
41. 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILI-
TARY TRIBUNAL 253 (1945).
42. United States v. Von Leeb (The High Command Case), reprinted in I I TRIALS
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stated that in holding "that the Hague and Geneva Conventions ex-
press accepted usages and customs of war, it must be noted that certain
detailed provisions pertaining to the care and treatment of prisoners of
war can hardly be so designated. Such details it is believed could be
binding only by international agreement.
43
At the present time, 161 states are parties to the 1949 Geneva Con-
ventions. 44 In view of the universality of the Geneva Conventions, it
may be concluded that their general principles, although not all the
detailed rules implementing these principles, are now customary law
binding on non-parties. As previously noted, the law relative to the pro-
tection of war victims has been updated periodically and has grown as
a direct result of the patient and impartial work of the International
Committee of the Red Cross through its dedication to the protection of
individual victims of war against the abuse of authority and indiffer-
ence to human suffering. The law of the Hague, however, was not up-
dated from the turn of the century until 1977, with the exception of the
Geneva Gas Protocol.45 During this period, there was no agency like
the International Committee of the Red Cross to ensure that the law of
the Hague was respected and periodically updated.
While the 1949 Diplomatic Conference was putting the finishing
touches on the four Geneva Conventions, the newly established United
Nations International Law Commission (ILC) was asked to codify the
law dealing with the conduct of hostilities. It declined the task reason-
ing that, "[w]ar having been outlawed, the regulation of its conduct
has ceased to be relevant" and that undertaking such a project at the
beginning of the ILC's existence would evince a lack of confidence in
the efficacy of the U.N. Charter's means for maintaining peace.4 0
In 1956, the International Red Cross made an effort to revise the
badly outdated 1907 Hague Regulations.' This effort was met with
enthusiasm by humanitarians and "Ban the Bomb" activists. Govern-
ments, however, reacted with polite inaction, most likely because the
proposed drafts were too restrictive of air power. In 1968, the United
OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNAL 462 (1950).
43. Id. at 535.
44. 25 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 60 (1985).
45. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating Poisonous or Other
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare of 17 June 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571,
T.I.A.S. No. 8061, 94 L.N.T.S. 65.
46. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly on the
Work of the First Session, 1949 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 281 (1950).
47. Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Draft Rules for the Limitation of the Danger
Incurred by the Civilian Population in Time of War, (2d ed. Geneva 1958), reprinted




Nations Conference on Human Rights,4 meeting in the shadow of the
Vietnam conflict, decided that updating the law of armed conflict was a
suitable project for the United Nations' attention.
The interest of the United Nations human rights community stimu-
lated the International Red Cross into action. The International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross began a process to update and clarify the four
Geneva Conventions and to modernize the rules of methods and means
of warfare.49 The new instruments were designed to supplement rather
than replace the existing Geneva Conventions, codifying the newly de-
veloped and emerging customary international law. The ICRC began a
series of consultations and conferences with government and Red Cross
experts. As a result of these consultations and conferences, the ICRC
drafted two protocols, one on international armed conflict and another
on internal armed conflict. These protocols formed the single negotiat-
ing text for a Diplomatic Conference convened by the Swiss Govern-
ment in 1974. After four annual sessions in Geneva, attended by 135
States, the Conference adopted the two protocols on June 10, 1977.0
III. THE CODIFICATION OF THE RULES FOR
PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS AGAINST THE EFFECTS OF
HOSTILITIES
The 1907 Hague Regulations dealing with the conduct of hostilities
on land were designed to apply to the immediate combat zone where
hostile land forces confront each other. To the extent that they pro-
tected civilians against the effects of hostilities, they contemplated
48. United Nations International Conference on Human Rights, Res. XXIII, 12
May 1968, text published in Final Act of the United Nations International Conference
on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 32/41, U.N. Sales No. E.68.XIV.2 (1968),
reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLUCTS 197-98 (D. Schindler & J. Toman 2d
rev. ed. 1981); G.A. Res. 2444, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 50-51, U.N. Doc.
A/7218 (1968) [hereinafter referred to as U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2444].
49. See Baxter, Perspective: The Evolving Laws of Armed Conflict, 60 MiLt L
Rv. 99 (1973) (discussing the International Red Cross' participation in drafting hu-
manitarian law documents); see also XXIst International Conference of the Red Cross,
Resolution XIII, Reaffirmation and Development of the Laws and Customs Applicable
in Armed Conflict, Istanbul, Turkey, 1969.
50. Protocol I, supra note 3; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Pro-
tocol II), opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARED CON-
FucTs 619 (D. Schindler & J. Toman 2d rev. ed. 1981).
As of November, 1985, 51 states were parties to Protocol I and 44 states were par-
ties to Protocol II. The People's Republic of China is the only permanent member of
the Security Council to be a party to both Protocols. France is a party to Protocol II
only and is the only State to be a party to Protocol II without also being a party to
Protocol I. Cyprus, Vietnam, Zaire, Cuba, Mexico, Mozambique, Syria and Angola are
parties to Protocol I but not to Protocol II. 25 INT'L REv. RED CRoss 61-62 (1985).
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bombardment and sieges of defended cities and towns and required a
warning - unless the element of surprise was necessary - so that
civilians might leave or take shelter. Bombardment of undefended
places, i.e., places open to occupation without resistance, was recog-
nized as unnecessary and was thus prohibited. Pillage was prohibited,
even after an assault of a besieged city. Although the emergence of air
power was dimly recognized, air bombardment was thought to be feasi-
ble only for the close support of ground forces - a sort of supplement
to artillery. In bombarding defended towns, precautions were required
as to educational, scientific, religious and cultural objects, which were
not to be attacked if properly marked. 1 With the exception of military
objectives in undefended ports, the hinterland was believed to be secure
from the effects of hostilities. It was recognized, however, that military
objectives located in undefended ports might be attacked by naval gun-
fire. The Hague Convention No. IX concerning Bombardment of Naval
Forces recognized that collateral civilian casualties might result and
urged that precautions be taken to avoid or minimize them. 2 The
Hague Conventions and the Hague Regulations applied through World
Wars I and II, during which time air power shattered any illusion
about the security of the hinterland.
The Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, Part II, provided new rules
for the protection of the civilian population of the countries in conflict.
Articles 13 through 26, inter alia, specify that civilian hospitals, medi-
cal transports and medical personnel are immune from attack. 3 Arti-
cles 14 and 15 provide for the establishment of safe refuges to protect
certain classes of civilians from the effects of war. 4 Article 14 contem-
plates the deliberate and preplanned establishment of hospital and
safety zones in rear areas for military and civilian wounded, sick and
aged persons, children under fifteen, expectant mothers and mothers of
children under seven. These zones may be established by unilateral ac-
tion but agreement as to the mutual recognition of such zones is en-
couraged. Article 15 provides for the establishment by mutual agree-
ment of neutralized zones in areas where fighting is taking place. 8
51. Hague Regulations, supra note 1, at arts. 25-28.
52. Hague Convention No. IX, supra note I, at art. 2.
53. Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, supra note 2, at arts. 13-26.
54. Id. at arts. 14-15.
55. Id. at art. 15. The 1982 Falkland Islands conflict presented an opportunity to
test the efficacy of article 15. As the British drew close to Port Stanley-Puerto Argen-
tino on the Falkland-Malvinas Islands, the Argentine and British authorities agreed, at
the suggestion of the ICRC, to establish a neutralized zone in the center of town. The
zone was never actually established, however, because active hostilities came to an end
shortly after the agreement was concluded. S. JUNOD, PROTECTION OF THE VICTIMS OF
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These zones serve as refuges for the wounded and sick and for civilians
who take no part in the hostilities and who, while they reside in the
zone, perform no work of a military nature.
By 1968, the development of air power and the increased destructive-
ness of modern weapons necessitated the formulation of new rules for
the protection of civilian populations. The basic principles of customary
law were expressed in the 1968 U.N. General Assembly Resolution
2444, Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts:
a. [T]he right of the parties to a conflict to adopt means of injuring the enemy is
not unlimited;
b. [I]t is prohibited to launch attacks against the civilian population as such;
c. [A] distinction must be made at all times between persons taking an active
part in the hostilities and members of the civilian population to the effect that
the latter be spared as much as possible."'
The statement of the first abstract principle requires some explana-
tion of the layers of limitations on the choice of methods and means of
warfare. First, there are specific prohibitions and restrictions as ex-
pressed in the "rules of international law applicable in armed con-
fict. '"5 7 For example, there are specific prohibitions against the use of
poison or poisoned weapons: the employment of weapons and methods
of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suf-
fering, perfidious killing, wounding or capturing of enemy combatants,
denial of quarter, the murder of prisoners of war or other detained per-
sons, attacks on civilians, attacks on specifically protected objects, and
misuse of protective signs.58
Next, there are conditional prohibitions against certain acts for
which exceptions may be made in cases of urgent or imperative necessi-
ties of war. The most important of these is the prohibition against
seizure or destruction of the enemy's property in the absence of urgent
military necessity.59
ARMED CONFLICT FALKLAND-MALVINAS ISLANDS (1982) 33-34 (1984).
56. U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2444, supra note 48. The 1968 resolution,
adopted unanimously, borrowed its provisions from a 1965 International Red Cross
Resolution. See 20th International Conference of the Red Cross, Resolution XXVIII,
Protection of Civilian Populations Against the Dangers of Indiscriminate Warfare, Vi-
enna, Austria, 1965, reprinted in THE LAws OF ARMED CoNuIrs, supra note 3, at
195; Hague Regulations, supra note I (first provision reaffirming the well-established
Hague principle embodied in article 22 of the Hague Regulations); Protocol I, supra
note 3 (Article 35(l) of Protocol I also reaffirms the principle embodied in article 22 of
the Hague Regulations).
57. Protocol I, supra note 3, at art. 2(b).
58. Hague Regulations, supra note 1; Protocol I, supra note 3, at arts. 37-42, 51-56.
59. Regulations, supra note 1, at art. 23(g); Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949,
supra note 2, at art. 53.
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Finally, there are prohibitions inherent in the complementary princi-
ples of necessity and humanity which underlie the law governing the
conduct of hostilities. The principle of necessity justifies only those
measures of military violence not forbidden by international law that
are relevant and proportionate to securing the prompt submission of the
enemy with the least possible expenditure of economic or human re-
sources.60 The principle of humanity complements the principle of ne-
cessity by forbidding those measures of violence that are not necessary,
i.e., not relevant or proportionate to the achievement of a definite mili-
tary advantage.61
Inherent in the principles we have discussed are the following ele-
ments: (1) there are limitations on the methods and means of warfare;
(2) these limitations are expressed in binding international law; (3) loss
of life and destruction of property must have some rational tendency to
the prompt achievement of a definite military advantage; and (4) such
casualties and damage must not be disproportionate or excessive in re-
lation to the military advantage anticipated. 62 Necessity, like its com-
ponents of relevance and proportionality, is a relational concept. To
speak of necessity, or the lack thereof, is to raise the question: neces-
sary or unnecessary for what?6"
A. Analyzing the Components of Necessity: Relevance and
Proportionality
Relevance means a rational tendency to the prompt achievement of a
definite military advantage. Proportionality means not excessive in rela-
tion to the military advantage anticipated. When viewed from the
standpoint of national-strategic planning, the necessity must be judged
in relation to the attainment of the object for which the armed conflict
is waged. From the viewpoint of the field commander and his tactical
planners, necessity, relevance, and proportionality must be judged in
relation to the attainment of a definite military advantage. Definite
means concrete and perceptible, rather than hypothetical or specula-
tive. It is in this sense that the term necessity is used in Protocol I in
the articles dealing with the protection of the civilian population.
4
60. Lieber Instructions, supra note 20, at arts. 14-16; M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICI-
ANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTER-
NATIONAL COERCION 525-30 (1961); M. BOTHE, K. PARTSCH & W. SOLF, supra note
27, at 194-95.
61. M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 60, at 525.
62. M. BOTHE, K. PARTSCH & W. SOLF, supra note 27, at 195.
63. M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 60, at 525.
64. Protocol I, supra note 3, at arts. 51(5)(b), 52(2), 57(2)(a)(iii).
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B. Protecting the Civilian Population
Protocol I reaffirms and supports the customary principles that pro-
hibit the attack on civilians and civilian objects, and that require that
distinctions be made between the treatment of combatants and civil-
ians. In furtherance of these principles, Protocol I includes detailed im-
plementing rules, most of which reaffirm or clarify the customary rules
designed to protect civilians against the effects of attacks.
The articles adopted in Protocol I utilize four different approaches to
reinforce the customary norms. First, there are the provisions designed
to revitalize and strengthen the distinction between military objectives
and civilians/civilian objects. Second, are provisions which clarify the
legal regulation of attacks. Particularly, these incorporate the rule of
proportionality and a prohibition against indiscriminate attacks. Third,
are a group of provisions which define in detail the precautionary steps
that both the attackers and defenders must take to avoid or minimize
civilian casualties and damage to civilian objects. Finally, in an effort
to provide more objective legal protection for the civilian population,
there are specific provisions that limit or prohibit attacks on particular
objects and on specified areas.
1. Strengthening the Distinction Between Civilian and Military
Objects
The provisions of Protocol I do not preclude attacks that may cause
civilian casualties. The Protocol does, however, require that parties to
the conflict direct their military operations only against military objec-
tives. Accordingly, article 48 requires that a commander have some co-
herent military objective in mind when he decides upon an attack, and
his plan of attack must be directed toward destroying, neutralizing or
capturing that military objective.65
Article 52 defines military objectives as those objects: which by their
nature, location and use make an effective contribution to the enemy's
military action; and (2) whose destruction, capture or neutralization,
"in the circumstances ruling at the time, offer a definite military ad-
vantage."6 16 For the first time, article 52 gives an explicit definition of
military objectives, thus providing guidance in distinguishing civilian
65. Protocol I, supra note 3, at art. 48. See also U.N. General Assembly Resolution
2444, supra note 47 (Article 48 paraphrasing the basic rules stated in paragraphs 2-3
of the resolution).
66. Protocol I, supra note 3, at art. 52(2) (emphasis added).
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objects from military objectives.6 7 This distinction between civilian and
military objects is further clarified through explicit definitions of civil-
ians and the civilian population.68 In addition, there are presumptions
regarding the treatment of civilian houses, schools, places of worship
and other objects normally dedicated to civilian use.69 To the extent
that Protocol I clarifies and implements the principle of civilian immu-
nity and the principle of distinction, its provisions should be considered
customary law.
2. Clarifying Regulations of Attacks
Further efforts to strengthen customary law are reflected in the pro-
visions of Protocol I which clarify and develop the regulation of at-
tacks. Article 51 prohibits making civilians the object of an attack, al-
though civilians may lose such protection in event of their direct
participation in the hostilities with the intent to cause physical harm to
enemy personnel and objects.7 0 Indiscriminate attacks are also prohib-
ited and illustrated as including broad area-wide attacks on several
clearly separated military objectives located among concentrations of
civilians, and disproportionate attacks.7' Finally, reprisal attacks on ci-
vilians are prohibited.72 Additionally, these provisions place duties upon
armed forces toward civilians under their control by prohibiting the use
of civilians to shield military objectives or to shield, favor or impede
military operations.73 In general, article 51 reaffirms existing custom-
ary law prohibiting attacks against civilians as such.
It should be noted, however, that under article 52 civilian objects
lose their protection if they are used to make an effective contribution
67. Earlier efforts to provide an explicit definition had failed, primarily because such
definition was considered inappropriate in a humanitarian instrument. See supra notes
27-29 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of clear definitions of prohibited
conduct). Article 52 overcomes the traditional objections in two ways. First, article 52
states the rule in the traditional prohibitory manner, and defines civilian objects in the
negative as "all objects which are not military objectives as defined in paragraph 2."
Second, article 52 limits attacks to objects that meet its two-pronged test. Protocol I,
supra note 3, at art. 52.
68. Protocol I, supra note 3, at art. 50(l)-50(2).
69. Id. at art. 51(2)-51(3).
70. Id. at art. 51(4)-51(5).
71. Id.
72. Id. at art. 51(6). Reprisals are acts of retaliation in the form of conduct which
would otherwise be unlawful, taken as a last resort by one party to a conflict against
enemy personnel or property in response to a manifest and serious violation of the law
of armed conflict, for the sole purpose of enforcing compliance with the rules of that
law. Reprisals must be proportionate to the accomplishment of their intended purpose,
and must be halted when the enemy's unlawful conduct has ceased.
73. Id. at art. 51(7).
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to enemy military action and if their destruction, capture, or neutrali-
zation offers a definite military advantage.7 4 This is a lesser standard
than that which causes loss of protection to civilian persons. Thus,
while a civilian may not lose his protection against individualized at-
tack while working in a munitions plant, he assumes the risk of collat-
eral injury when he is in the vicinity of the munitions plant, although
he continues to retain full protection while at home.
Articles 51 and 52 provide prohibitions against reprisals or retalia-
tory attacks against civilians and civilian objects.76 These prohibitions
break new ground and thus cannot be considered reaffirmation of cus-
tomary law. The 1949 Geneva Conventions prohibit reprisals against
the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, as well as against medical person-
nel, units and establishments and transports, prisoners of war, and pro-
tected civilians. 6 It should be noted that the term "protected persons"
includes only civilians in the power of a party of which they are not
nationals. Thus, the population of a party under the control of that
party is not protected against reprisals."
Articles 51 and 57 contain the first codifications of the rule of pro-
portionality. The rule prohibits attacks that may be expected to cause
incidental civilian casualties or property damage which would be exces-
sive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage antici-
pated.7 8 If viewed as a restatement of the basic principle of military
necessity, i.e., relevance and proportionality, this would undoubtedly be
considered a reaffirmation of customary law. Whether the other illus-
tration, that demonstrating the prohibition against treating a number
of clearly separated and distinct targets as a single military objective,
constitutes a new development or a reaffirmation of existing law de-
pends on how one construes the term "clearly separated." If it is con-
strued as meaning separated at such a distance and under such circum-
stances that the military targets can be attacked separately, it is
probably a reaffirmation of customary international law.
3. Emphasizing Precautionary Measures
Precautionary measures intended to avoid or minimize civilian casu-
74. Id. at art. 52(2).
75. Id. at arts. 51(6), 52(1).
76. First Geneva Convention, supra note 2, at art. 47; Second Geneva Convention,
supra note 2, at art. 47; Third Geneva Convention, supra note 2, at art. 13(1); Fourth
Geneva Convention, supra note 2, at art. 33(3).
77. Id. at art. 4; see also Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property, 14
May 1954 249 U.N.T.S. 340, art. 4 (prohibiting reprisals against cultural property).
78. Protocol I, supra note 3, at arts. 51(5)(b) and 57(2)(iii).
1986]
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
alties and damage to civilian property, which both the attacker and
defender must take, are emphasized in articles 57 and 58, as well as in
an extensive codification of rules pertaining to civil defense in articles
61-67.
Under the provisions of article 57, commanders and their planning
staff are required to take all feasible measures to verify that targets of
an attack are military objectives. Moreover, they are required to take
all feasible precautions in the choice of methods and means of attack to
avoid or minimize collateral injury to civilians or damage to civilian
objects. They must refrain from launching any attack which may be
expected to cause collateral civilian casualties or damage to civilian ob-
jects excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advan-
tage.7 9 If it becomes apparent during an attack that the objective is not
a military one or that disproportionate civilian casualties or damage to
civilian property may result, the attack must be cancelled or sus-
pended.80 Furthermore, where an attack may affect the civilian popula-
tion, advance warning is required unless the circumstances preclude
such action by the necessity of surprise 1 To the greatest extent possi-
ble, the party controlling the civilian population should endeavor to
evacuate civilians from the vicinity of military objectives, to avoid lo-
cating military objectives within or near densely populated areas, and
to take any additional precautions, such as the provision of shelters and
civilian defense programs, to protect the civilian population against the
danger resulting from military operations.82
4. Providing Special Legal Protection
Although the provisions on the regulation of attacks are more de-
tailed than those of prior law, they remain to a large extent general
principles which require subjective judgment in specific situations. Rec-
ognizing this subjectivity, the diplomatic conference developed the
fourth approach to achieving improved protection for the civilian popu-
lation, viz., specific provisions regulating attacks on particular objects
and specific areas.
Article 53 prohibits acts of hostilities against culturally important
historic monuments, places of worship and works of art, and at the
same time prohibits use of such objects to support the military effort. 83
79. Id. at art. 57 (2)(a)(iii).
80. Id. at art. 57(2)(b).
81. Id. at art. 57(2)(c).
82. Id. at art. 58.
83. Id. at arts. 53(a)-53(b).
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Customary international law, as reflected in article 27 of the 1907
Hague Regulations, prohibits attacks on a variety of cultural and reli-
gious objects provided they are not used at the time for military pur-
poses. The 1954 Hague Convention, however, which provides for the
protection of cultural property, permits derogations, even in the case of
very important cultural objects, where imperative military necessity de-
mands such attacks.8 4 As article 53 of Protocol I is made subject to
both of these relevant conventions, it is not yet clear whether custom-
ary international law is as broad as article 53 seems to be.
By prohibiting the starvation of civilians as a method of warfare,
article 54 establishes a substantially new principle which is not yet cus-
tomary international law. 85 The customary practice, as illustrated by
article 17 of the Lieber Instructions, declares that "war is not carried
out by arms alone. It is lawful to starve the hostile belligerent, armed
or unarmed, so that it leads to the speedier subjection of the enemy." 80
This principle was modified somewhat by article 23 of the 1907 Hague
Regulations, but the prohibition was subject to derogation for military
necessity.87 As a policy, general devastation or a "scorched earth" was
permitted if there was an honest belief that urgent military necessity
required such action.88 Article 23 of the Fourth Geneva Convention
modified this principle modestly by requiring relief for only that portion
of the civilian population presumed incapable of making a substantial
contribution to their country's war effort, e.g., children under fifteen
and expectant mothers.8 9 Similarly, the provisions of Protocol I do not
depart entirely from customary practice as the protections granted are
not absolute. The specific prohibition against attack, destruction, re-
moval or rendering objects useless under article 54 pertains only to ac-
tion taken for the specific purpose of denial for its sustenance value, not
for any collateral effect the action may have on the civilian
population.90
Articles 35 and 55 of Protocol I prohibit the use of methods and
means of warfare which are intended or may be expected to cause
84. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Con-
flict of 14 May 1954, arts. 4(2), 11, 249 U.N.T.S. 240, reprinted in THE LAW OF
ARMED CONFLICTS 664 (D. Schindler & J. Toman 2d rev. ed. 1981).
85. Protocol I, supra note 3, at art. 54(1).
86. Lieber Instructions, supra note 20, at art. 17.
87. Hague Regulations, supra note 1, at art. 23(g).
88. United States v. List (The Hostage Case), reported in I I TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNAL 1230, 1233, 1295-97
(1950).
89. Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, supra note 2, at art. 23.
90. Protocol I, supra note 3, at art. 54(2).
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"widespread, long-term and severe" damage to the natural environment
and thereby prejudice the health or survival of the population.9 It
should be noted that the terms "widespread, long-term and severe" are
in the conjunctive, whereas in the Environmental Modification Treaty
(ENMOD Treaty)92 the comparable terms are in the disjunctive. Fur-
thermore, the negotiating record of articles 35 and 55 of Protocol I
demonstrates that "long-term" is construed to involve decades, whereas
in the ENMOD treaty, "long-lasting" is construed to involve seasons.9 3
Although the formulation is new, and the protections granted by Proto-
col I are greater, this prohibition is so basic that it must be construed
as being inherent to a general principle of law and thus, general inter-
national law.
Special protection for dams, dikes and nuclear-electric generating
stations is provided by article 56, which prohibits attacks on these
works and installations, and on military objectives located in their vi-
cinity if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and
consequent severe losses among the civilian population. 4 Some limited
exceptions to this protection exist. For example, the protection in arti-
cle 56 does not apply when the installation or military objective is used
in regular and direct support of military operations and if such attack
is the only feasible way to terminate such support. 5 Yet even if the
special protection is lost, the general protection of the Protocol and the
rule of proportionality remain in effect. It would require an extraordi-
narily important target and a very significant military advantage to
outweigh the severe civilian losses which might result from the danger-
ous forces released by the destruction of a dam, dike, or nuclear power
station. The practice of states has previously indicated great restraint
in the attacks of dams and dikes, the breach of which would cause such
severe civilian losses. Article 56 thus differs little from customary inter-
national law.
91. Id. at arts. 35(3) and 55.
92. See generally Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile
Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, signed at Geneva May 18, 1977, 31
U.S.T. 333, T.I.A.S. No. 6839.
93. Swiss FED. POLITICAL DEP'T, Berne Report of Committee III, CDDH/215/
Rev.1, 27 (1975); 15 OFRCIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON HU-
MANITARIAN LAW 268 (1978); Understandings Regarding the Convention on the Pro-
hibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Tech-
niques, Report by Committee of the Conference on Disarmament 1976, reprinted in
U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMA-
MENT AGREEMENTS 197 (1982); M. BOTHE, K. PARTSCH & W. SOLF, supra note 27, at
346-48.
94. Protocol I, supra note 3, at art. 56.
95. Id. at art. 56(2).
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Article 59 essentially clarifies and details the customary law prohibi-
tion of attacks on undefended places in the immediate combat zone
which are open to occupation without resistance."" It is thus a clear
declaration of well-established customary international law. By agree-
ment, states may provide special protection for certain demilitarized
zones under article 60; these are then declared off-limits to attacks and
any other form of military operation, so long as the agreement remains
in effect.9
Among the group of articles discussed, the only sharp changes from
customary international law are the prohibitions against reprisals in ar-
ticles 51-56 and the prohibition against starvation of civilians as a
method of warfare in article 54. The other changes merely clarify and
refine existing restraints, most of which will be recognized as either
emerging or established customary international law.
CONCLUSION
Protocol I accomplishes its purpose by modernizing and clarifying
the 1907 Hague Regulations in response to the danger presented by
modern warfare to the civilian population. The articles of Protocol I are
very complex in comparison with the simple statements of principle in
the Hague Regulations. Except for the prohibition of reprisal attacks,
however, the new rules are generally reaffirmations of existing custom-
ary law which is itself complex. In reaffirming customary law, Protocol
I defines such essential matters as military objectives and codifies the
rule of proportionality. Although these matters add to the complexity
of the text, they promote better understanding and simplify their appli-
cation on the battlefield.
In general, Protocol I reflects the attitude of the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross when it prepared the Draft Protocols:
In drawing up the Draft Protocol . . . the ICRC believes that it has remained
steadfast to the spirit in which, since 1864, it has demanded, for the benefit of
individuals, guarantees consistent with the dictates of humanity whilst bearing in
mind the realities of national defense and security! 3
96. Id. at art. 59.
97. Id. at art. 60.
98. IN'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, DRAFT PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GE-
NEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AuGusT 1949 AND RELATING TO THE PROTECTION OF VIC-
TIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 2 (1973).
1986]
